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POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT AS AN INDEPENDENT TEST
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the Supreme Court formulated a three-
pronged test2 to determine whether a statute violates the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.3 The first prong examines
whether the statute has a secular purpose,4 while under the second
prong the statute's primary effects must neither advance nor inhibit
religion. 5 The third prong has two parts. Under the first part, a statute
must not foster excessive administrative entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion.6 A statute that fails to pass either of the first two
1. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2. Id. at 612-13; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitu-
tional Law 1031 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak].
3. U.S. Const. amend. I. The amendment provides in part that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... " Id. The first clause is referred to as the establishment clause, and the
second as the free exercise clause. J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1029. The Supreme
Court has applied the proscriptions of both clauses to state action through the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-2, at
813-14 (1978); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (establishment
clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-07 (1940) (free exercise clause).
See generally School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the history of the establishment clause's incorporation).
4. 403 U.S. at 612. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
5. 403 U.S. at 612; see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)
(quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). See infra notes 33-41
and accompanying text.
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at
1031. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
7. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); R. Miller & R.
Flowers, Toward Benevolent Neutrality: Church, State, and the Supreme Court 302
(rev. ed. 1982); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 3, 17 (1978);
Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of
Church-State Contacts, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1981, at 143, 145; Note,
The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the
Public Schools, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1874, 1876 (1983); see Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1982);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236
(1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971).
It is unclear whether application of the Court's three-prong test is mandatory in all
establishment clause cases or whether the prongs are merely signposts of a possible
constitutional violation. Compare Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510
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prongs or the first part of the third prong will be held unconstitu-
tional. 7 The second part of the third prong, the political entanglement
test, examines whether the challenged statute has the potential for
dividing an electorate or legislature along religious lines., Although
the Court regards such division as dangerous9 because it may divert
legislative attention away from other important issues, 10 it has never
(1982) ("This Court has consistently held that a statute must satisfy three criteria to
pass muster under the Establishment Clause.") and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
40-41 (1980) (per curiam) ("If a statute violates any [one prong], it must be struck
down under the Establishment Clause.") with Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W.
4317, 4320 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) ("[W]e have often found it useful to inquire whether
the challenged law or conduct [violates one of the three prongs].") and Mueller v.
Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (three-pronged test "provides 'no more than [a]
helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges") (quoting Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). In Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983),
the Court did not formally apply the test in holding constitutional the Nebraska
Legislature's practice of employing a Presbyterian chaplain for 16 years to open its
sessions with prayer. Id. at 3336-37. Instead, the Court focused on the practice's
limited potential for leading to an actual establishment of religion, id. at 3335, 3337,
and on legislative prayer's unbroken history of national acceptance. Id. at 3332-35.
Justice Brennan, however, expressed his belief that the Court's failure to apply the
test did not represent a "reshaping" of establishment clause doctrine, but rather an
exception to accommodate legislative prayer. Id. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971); accord Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229, 258 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866; Gaffney, Political Divisiveness
Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad
Public Policy, 24 St. Louis U.L.J. 205, 206 & n.7 (1980); Schotten, The Establish-
ment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitu-
tional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 207, 222 (1979); Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative
and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1189 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Aid to Religion].
9. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512
(1982); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 258 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-96 (1973); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-95 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429, 431-32 (1962); Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217, 228 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); see also L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 867 (Court has stressed danger
of political division along religious lines); Ellington, The Principle of Nondivisiveness
and the Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 5 Ga. L. Rev. 429, 446-
47 (1971) (various Justices have recognized the danger of political division along
religious lines); cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (neutrally motivated governmental activity not unconstitutional if it
does not foster divisive influences).
10. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); see Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) (competing efforts by
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invalidated a statute solely because it violated the political entangle-
ment test." Instead, the Court has viewed a statute's potential for
fostering political division along religious lines as a "warning signal,' ' 2
triggering stricter scrutiny of the statute under the other three tests of
Lemon. 13
There is reason, however, to elevate the political entanglement test
to the level of the other tests of Lemon. Such an elevation would not
be based on the premise that political division along religious lines
diverts legislative attention away from other issues, but rather on the
premise that such division is not only a danger in its own right, but a
symptom of a greater danger: the fusion of governmental and reli-
gious functions. 14
Although the Court has never elevated the political entanglement
test to a fourth prong, the Court's language in two recent decisions
permits an interpretation that regards political division along religious
lines as indicating that a fusion of governmental and religious func-
religious groups to gain support of government strains political system "to the break-
ing point") (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion").
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); id. at 4326 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d
598, 616 n.34 (7th Cir. 1980); Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979);
L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868; Note, A Departurefrom Benevolent Neutral-
ity-Decker v. O'Donnell, 30 De Paul L. Rev. 739, 745 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Benevolent Neutrality]; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S.
March 5, 1984).
12. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797-98 (1973) ("[W]hile the prospect of [political] divisiveness may not alone warrant
the invalidation of state laws ... it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored.")
(citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)); accord Lynch v. Donnelly,
52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4326-27 (U.S. March 5, 1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15 (1975) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973)); L. Tribe, supra note 3, §
14-12, at 868.
13. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866; see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
365 n.15 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794-98 (1973); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1035; Pickrell & Horwich, "Religion
as an Engine of Civil Policy"- A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on
the Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, 44 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Spring 1981, at 111, 121; Ripple, The Entanglement Test of' the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1195, 1203 (1980).
14. The Court has long regarded a fusion of governmental and religious functions
as a principal danger addressed by the establishment clause. See Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948); cf.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871) ("The structure of our govern-
ment has ... rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference [and] has
secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.").
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tions may occur. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' 5 the Court held
that a statute giving churches veto power over applications for liquor
licenses within a certain distance of the church 16 excessively entangled
religion with the affairs of government because the statute vested
governmental authority in a religious body.17 The Court's use of en-
tanglement analysis in this context suggests that the political entangle-
ment test may go beyond scrutiny of a statute's potential divisiveness
to determine if the statute represents a "fusion of governmental and
religious functions.' 8 More recently, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 9 the
Court rejected the argument that a town's inclusion of a Nativity
scene in its Christmas display created potential for fostering political
division along religious lines. 20 Finding that the practice had not
engendered division before the lawsuit,2 ' the Court wrote that a
litigant could not "by the very act of commencing a lawsuit ...
create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of
entanglement.2 2 This language implies that political division along
religious lines, when not manufactured by parties to a lawsuit, may
serve as evidence that political and religious functions have fused.
The Court did not state that such evidence would raise the political
entanglement test to an independent fourth prong. This Note, how-
ever, argues that because such fusion enables politically powerful
religious groups to exert excessive influence over the political process,
the political entanglement test must be elevated to an independent test
of constitutionality.2 3 Governmental programs providing financial aid
to the secular functions of religious institutions often require annual
appropriation battles before the legislature.2 4 When these battles di-
vide legislators along religious lines, the religious institutions with the
most political power are likely to receive the largest appropriations, to
the detriment of less powerful groups.2 5
15. 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
16. Id. at 507, 509.
17. Id. at 511-12.
18. Id. at 512 (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
19. 52 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984).
20. Id. at 4321-22.
21. Id. at 4321.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. This test, however, should in no way affect the ability of religious institutions
to influence legislation in accordance with their ideological beliefs. See infra notes
119-34 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. Such less powerful groups may
also include secular institutions. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1968) (government must act neutrally as between religion and nonreligion); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (government
may not favor religion over nonreligion).
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In light of the resulting harm to these less powerful groups, the
political entanglement test should be independently capable of strik-
ing down legislation that by its nature will lead to a fusion of govern-
mental and religious functions. Furthermore, legislation not yet
amounting to a fusion of these functions may hold such ominous
potential for dividing political bodies according to their religious dif-
ferences that fusion inevitably will result. The political entanglement
test should be capable of striking down such legislation even if it passes
scrutiny under the other prongs of the Court's establishment clause
test.
I. THE Lemon TEST: THE THREE INDEPENDENT PRONGS
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the Supreme Court announced that legis-
lation does not violate the establishment clause if it has a secular
legislative purpose, primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance
religion, and does not foster excessive administrative or political en-
tanglement between government and religion.2 7 Through the secular
purpose test, the Court seeks to determine whether the legislature
intended the challenged enactment to inhibit or advance religion. 2 A
judicial finding of either purpose can invalidate the statute.2 9 Most
statutes pass this test30 because lawmakers have become skillful at
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id. at 612-13; accord Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510
(1982) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1982) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271
(1981) (same); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (same);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980);
Wolman v. Waiter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 748 (1976) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971));
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). But see Lynch v.
Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4320 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) ("unwillingness to be con-
fined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
28. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963); R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; Ellington, supra
note 9, at 439. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-8 (history and relevance of
secular purpose test); Aid to Religion, supra note 8, at 1178-81 (same).
29. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); R. Miller & R.
Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; see School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
30. See R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302. The secular purpose test has
been determinative in only three cases. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43
(1980) (per curiam) (state statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in public
school rooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (state law prohibiting
teaching of Darwinian evolution in public schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (state law requiring daily recitation of Lord's Prayer and Bible
readings in public schools).
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writing a secular purpose into their enactments 3' and the Court rarely
questions the stated purpose. 32
The primary effect test looks beyond the legislature's intent to
ascertain whether the law's immediate effects either inhibit or ad-
vance religion. 33 The Court's scrutiny of a law's effects continues
beyond the finding of a primary secular effect to determine if the law
also has a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion.3 4 The test,
however, does not distinguish between "primary" and "secondary"
effects, but between those that are direct and immediate, as opposed
to ones that are remote and incidental.3 5 For example, governmental
funding of a religious institution's religious function aids religion di-
rectly, 36 whereas funding of such an institution's secular function may
only indirectly aid religion if the government can fund that function
without creating the danger that the appropriated funds will be used
for religious purposes. 37 In deciding whether this danger exists, the
Court examines the degree to which religion permeates the benefited
institution3 and the severability of its secular and religious func-
31. R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; Aid to Religion, .supra note 8, at
1179.
32. Aid to Religion, supra note 8, at 1179; see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
236 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741-42 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413
U.S. 472, 479 n.7 (1973). The Court's tendency not to question a statute's stated
purpose reflects the Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives" to a
governmental body. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4325 (U.S. Mar. 5,
1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066
(1983).
33. R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; J. Nowak, supra note 2, at
1031; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4320 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984); Mueller
v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505,
510 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); L. Tribe, supra note 3, §
14-9, at 840.
34. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 n.1 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973)); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 840.
35. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973); L. Tribe, supra note
3, § 14-9, at 840; Aid to Religion, supra note 8, at 1181.
36. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring);
see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975) (direct aid to religious institution's
sectarian function violates effects test).
37. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 365 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
38. R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 363 (1975) (unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion found because
of "predominantly religious character" of benefited parochial schools); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) ("Aid normally may be thought to have a primary
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
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tions. 39 If the Court finds that government can directly aid the institu-
tion's secular function without risking direct aid to its religious func-
tion, the challenged program will pass the primary effect test. 40 Thus,
the primary effect test does not prohibit aid to an institution's religious
function provided that the aid is indirect. 41
Even if a statute passes scrutiny under the purpose and effect tests,
it will fall if the Court finds a potential for fostering excessive adminis-
trative entanglement between government and religion. 42 The Court
has found such potential when the challenged program requires gov-
ernmental surveillance of a religious institution's activities or monitor-
ing of its records to ensure that it does not use public money for
religious purposes. 43 The administrative entanglement test is therefore
closely related to the primary effect test. The governmental watch-
dogging constitutionally required to ensure that public funzls do not
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting."); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (Aid to certain religiously-affiliated colleges has no primary religion-ad-
vancing effect because "the schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic
freedom rather than religious indoctrination."); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-9, at
840-41; Aid to Religion, supra note 8, at 1182-83. The Court has reasoned that if no
clear boundary exists between a religiously permeated institution's secular and reli-
gious functions, direct aid to the one may ultimately directly aid the other. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975); see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973).
39. R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302; L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-9,
at 840-42; Aid to Religion, supra note 8, at 1183-84; see Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
743 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755, 759 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 680-83 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also Pickrell & Horwich,
supra note 13, at 117 (aid to religion is only indirect if activity funded is strictly
secular).
41. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (plurality opinion); see, e.g.,
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069-71 (1983) (tax deductions to parents with
expenses incurred in educating their children held constitutional even though deduc-
tions indirectly aided sectarian schools); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244
(1968) (state loans of school books to parochial school students held constitutional
even though loans encouraged students to attend parochial schools); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (state reimbursement of bus fares to parents of
students attending sectarian schools held constitutional even though parents encour-
aged to send children to those schools).
42. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866; Pevar, Public Schools Must Stop
Having Christmas Assemblies, 24 St. Louis U.L.J. 327, 343 (1980); see Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
251-52 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
43. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 370-71 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
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directly advance religion may itself be so excessive as to violate the
establishment clause. 44 This test rests on the premise that "both reli-
gion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each
is left free from the other within its respective sphere." 45 Conse-
quently, the test seeks to insulate religion from the corrupting or
secularizing influence of government. 46
The Court has recognized, however, that the complexities of mod-
ern society inevitably produce some entanglement between church
and state.47 For example, in deciding whether a state could constitu-
tionally exempt church property from taxation, the Court noted that
both exemption and taxation fostered some degree of church-state
contact. 48 In deciding whether such contact reaches an "excessive"
level in any given case, the Court examines the character and purposes
of the benefited institution, the resulting relationship between govern-
ment and religion, and the nature of the aid that the state provides. 49
The Court has stated that the secular purpose, primary effect and
administrative entanglement prongs are independent tests of constitu-
tionality.50 The political entanglement test, however, has never risen
to the prominence of the other prongs.51 Whether the political en-
tanglement test may stand as an independent fourth prong can be
determined by examining its doctrinal underpinnings and application.
44. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-71 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 613, 615-16 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); R.
Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302.
45. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); accord
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866.
46. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 772 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971); id. at 634 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 & n.7 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866; cf.
Kurland, supra note 7, at 11-13 (discussing the theory that church-state separation
protects the church from the corrupting influence of the state); Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Tax Relief for Parents of Children Attending Public and Nonpublic
Schools, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 793, 821 (1983) (legislation primarily aiding sectarian
schools tends to secularize school) [hereinafter cited as Tax Relief].
47. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
745-46 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 760-61 & n.5 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
48. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970); accord Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793; Ellington, supra note
9, at 441-43.
49. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1031.
50. See supra note 7.
51. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1983)
(O'Connor., J., concurring); Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 616 n.34 (7th Cir.
1980); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868.
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II. THE POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT TEST
A. The Doctrinal Underpinnings
Through the political entanglement test the Court has sought to
identify legislation that holds potential for dividing legislators or
members of the voting public according to their religious differences. 52
In applying the test, the Court has regarded legislation providing
financial aid to religious institutions as holding such potential.5 3 When
a statute's implementation requires annual appropriation battles be-
fore the legislature, partisans of the aid inevitably will champion their
cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. 54 Opponents
of the aid, "whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will
inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign
techniques to prevail." 55 Candidates will declare their intentions on
the issues, and voters will be forced to choose. Many candidates and
voters will find their votes aligned with their faith, and political
division will occur along religious lines. 56
When the Court in Lemon wrote that the first amendment sought
to guard against such division, it was not espousing new doctrine.
Justices had previously argued that political division resulting from a
52. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 867; see Pickrell & Horwich, supra note
13, at 121; see, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15, 372 (1975); Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794, 796-97 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 & n.15 (1975) (loans of
instructional materials to predominantly church-related nonpublic schools); id. at
367, 372 (provision of auxiliary services by public school teachers and counselors to
nonpublic school children on nonpublic school premises); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774, 794-98 (1973) (direct grants for
maintenance and repair to predominantly church-related nonpublic schools); id. at
780, 789, 794-98 (tuition reimbursements and tax benefits to parents of children
attending nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 622-23
(1971) (salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects at church-related elemen-
tary and secondary schools; reimbursements to such schools for actual expenditures
for teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials).
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); accord Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)); see Decker v. O'Donnell,
661 F.2d 598, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1980); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 418 (S.D.
Ohio), af'd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); accord Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)); see Decker v. O'Donnell,
661 F.2d 598, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1980); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 418 (S.D.
Ohio), af 'd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972); L. Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Consititu-
tion 60 (1975) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)).
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legislature's consideration of religious issues is dangerous5 7 Although
many Justices have agreed that such division is a danger, there has
been no consensus among courts or commentators regarding why it is
dangerous.58 Some critics of the political entanglement test have as-
sumed that the Court's fear of such division stems from a belief that it
engenders religious strife in the community.5 9 They urge abandon-
ment of the test on the ground that judicial removal of religiously
divisive issues from legislative purview will at best have no effect on
religious strife, and at worst will aggravate it.60 This reasoning is
flawed because it ignores the foundation on which the Court has
based the political entanglement test.
Together the political and administrative entanglement tests seek to
prevent "a fusion of governmental and religious functions,"61 and
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
57. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251, 254 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 226 (1963) (Clark, J.); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227-28 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Ellington,
supra note 9, at 446.
58. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (creates sectarian strife) and Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From
Separation to Detente in Church-State Relations, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 563, 568-69 (1977)
(same) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971) (diverts legislative
attention from other issues) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (allows dominating group to achieve dominant benefit) and
L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 869 (allows use of politics for religious ends) and
Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Edu-
cation, 91 Yale L. J. 1196, 1202-03 (1982) (threatens viability of political system)
[hereinafter cited as Humanistic Education].
59. See, e.g., J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1048; Hitchcock, The Supreme Court
and Religion: Historical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 St. Louis U.L.J. 183,
203 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hitchcock I]; Weber, School Aid and Political
Divisions, 38 Jurist 203, 204-05 (1978).
60. See, e.g., W. Berns, The First Amendment and the Future of American
Democracy 71-72 (1976) (aggravates); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1048 (merely shifts
focus of debate); Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the Supreme Court:
The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 Cath. U.L. Rev. 207, 259 (1978)
(aggravates); Schotten, supra note 8, at 224 (same); Schwartz, No Imposition of
Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 Yale L.J. 711 (1968) (merely alters
source of controversy); Weber, supra note 59, at 208 (aggravates); Recent Statute,
Constitutionality of Federal Financial Aid to Church-Related Colleges, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1353, 1357 (1964) (same).
61. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982) (quoting School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674-75 (1970); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 865-66; cf. School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (establishment clause prohibits fusion); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (establishment clause intended to prevent union of
government and religion).
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thus, are opposite sides of the same coin. The administrative strand
seeks to protect religion by insulating it from excessive governmental
intrusion or regulation.6 2 The political strand guards against religious
institutions' interference with the political process.6 3 The Court's con-
cern, therefore, is not that political division along religious lines will
foster religious strife, for such strife is inevitable in our pluralistic
society.6 4 Instead, the Court has based the political entanglement test
on the premise that political division along religious lines results in a
dangerous interference by religion with the affairs of government. 65
Consistent with this premise, the Court seeks to prevent such divi-
sion,66 but the question remains why the Court regards religious inter-
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1047; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 620-21 (1971); id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-
12, at 870; cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (governmental aid to religious groups may carry political controls); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942) (government may regulate that which it
subsidizes). See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
63. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); see Americans United for
Separation of Church & State v. School Dist., 718 F.2d 1389, 1401 (6th Cir. 1983);
Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 418 (S.D. Ohio), affd mem., 409 U.S. 808
(1972); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 865-66; cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (The Establishment Clause "was in-
tended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's hands
off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life by
denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy
or the public purse.").
64. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); Members of the
Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 699 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 162 (1983); Ellington, supra note 9, at 447; cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (state may not regulate speech
to prevent sectarian strife). But see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968)
(Black, J., dissenting) (government should not generate religious strife). Although the
Court has discussed "political strife" in its applications of the political entanglement
test, the Court has used the words only in the context of the effect such strife has on
the political process. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-97 (1973).
65. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1947; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 620-21 (1971); id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-
12, at 870.
66. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 & n.15 (1975) (loans of
instructional materials to predominantly church-related nonpublic schools); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774, 794-98
(1973) (direct grants for maintenance and repair to predominantly church-related
nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607, 609, 622 (1971) (salary
supplements to teachers of secular subjects at church-related elementary and second-
ary schools; reimbursements to such schools for actual expenditures for teachers'
salaries, textbooks and instructional materials).
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ference with the political process as a danger. One view is that such
interference threatens the healthy operation of government.61 Reli-
gious infiltration into the political process could lead to an excessive
legislative focus on religious issues to the exclusion of "other issues of
great urgency."6 8 This focus "could divert attention from the myriad
issues and problems that confront every level of government."69 Under
this view, therefore, religious entanglement with governmental affairs
is dangerous because it is bad for government. This analysis is prob-
lematic because it assumes that issues affecting religion somehow
consume more time and energy than other vexing subjects of legisla-
tive concern, that religious issues are less important than other issues,
or that religious issues are evil or corrupting. 0 The establishment
clause, however, is neither a declaration of hostility to religion nor the
guardian of government.71 Instead, along with the free exercise
clause, it protects religious freedom. 72
A better view, therefore, is that religious interference with the
political process is dangerous because it threatens the rights of the
members of religious groups lacking political power. 73 The danger
67. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971); accord Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 374-75 (1975) (Brennan, J, dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971)); see Ellington, supra note 9, at 446-47 (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Humanistic Edu-
cation, supra note 58, at 1202-03.
68. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
69. Id.
70. See Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American
Pluralism, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1981, at 3, 8-9 [hereinafter cited as
Hitchcock II]; Hitchcock I, supra note 59, at 203.
71. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4318 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315
(1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); cf. Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F.
Supp. 421, 433 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970) ("The Establishment Clause is the guardian of
the interests of society as a whole and is particularly invested with the rights of
minorities."), aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
72. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 40, 52-53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F.
Supp. 421, 433 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971); Pfeffer,
Freedom and Separation: America's Contribution to Civilization, 2 J. Church &
State 100, 105 (1960); Smart, Widmar v. Vincent and the Purposes of the Establish-
ment Clause, 9 J. Coll. & Univ. L. 469, 475, 482-83 (1982-1983).
73. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge J.,
dissenting); Comment, Publicly-Funded Display of Religious Symbols: The Nativity
Scene Controversy, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 353, 353 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Religious
Symbols]; cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (establishment clause prevents use of secular institution for sectarian ends);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 227 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (equat-
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arises not because religious interference is in and of itself evil, but
because such interference allows religious groups constituting a major-
ity or those with superior resources to exert excessive influence over
the political process.74 When an issue of public aid to religious institu-
tions is before the legislature, the religious groups with the power to
employ the political machinery in furtherance of their own interests
are likely to receive the largest slice of the economic pie.7 5 Although
the American system is a democracy, in which the will of the majority
generally prevails, "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy
[and] to place them beyond the reach of majorities ... .176 Conse-
quently, political division along religious lines should be avoided be-
cause it indicates that religious interests have interfered with the
legislative process, and such interference creates the danger that reli-
gious interests with political strength will control the government's
purse strings. 7
The resulting injury.to less powerful groups can take two forms.
First, when a legislature excessively influenced by a religious faction
appropriates substantial financial aid for that faction, religious groups
ing establishment of religion with church control of state); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 426-27, 429 (1962) (union of church and state endangers rights of members of
minority religious groups); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (first amendment's purpose to ensure that no powerful sect uses political
power to harm dissenters); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
216-17 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Constitution protects minorities); Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (religious interference with temporal
institutions threatens civil liberty); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730
(1871) (same).
74. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 429 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); Members of the Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 699 F.2d 1, 12
n.11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 162 (1983); Curry, James Madison and the
Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Separation, 56 Ind. L.J. 615, 619
n.35 (1981); Religious Symbols, supra note 73, at 353.
75. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
id. at 53-54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251
(1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Members of the Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt,
699 F.2d 1, 12 n.11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 162 (1983); Kosydar v.
Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972), af'd mee. sub nom. Grit v.
Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 120-21
(D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 602; cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 702
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (control of school board by a religious group would
lead to use of secular institution for sectarian ends).
76. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (quoting West Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)); see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
77. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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which lack power will be economically disadvantaged; they will have
fewer resources to advance their religious beliefs and achieve their
goals. 78 Second, less powerful groups may perceive a symbolic govern-
mental identification with the particular faith or faiths aided.79 The
political entanglement test, therefore, does not guard against injury to
the political system, but against politically powerful religious groups'
use of that system to their own economic and symbolic advantage.
B. The Application
The Supreme Court has stated that "there is no single constitutional
caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree" to which any
one prong of the Lemon test is applicable to the governmental action
under scrutiny.80 Nevertheless, the Court has consistently regarded the
purpose, effect and administrative entanglement tests as separate and
independent tests of constitutionality. 81 The Court's position on the
role of the political entanglement test is not as clear. 82 Although the
78. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutled7e, J.,
dissenting); cf. Donnelly v. Lynch, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("excessive entanglement [may give religious] institutions
access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of
the religion").
79. See L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868; Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W.
4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. id. at 4322 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring) (endorsement of particular religion "sends a message to non-
adherents that they are outsiders"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505,
511 (1982) ("[T]he mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of
some by reason of the power conferred.").
80. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
n.31 (1973) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
81. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
82. See J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1034-35; Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 683 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Choper I]; Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From Separa-
tion to Detente in Church-State Relations, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 563, 569 (1977). In
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the
Court indicated that a statute's potential for fostering political division along reli-
gious lines may not alone warrant the statute's invalidation. Id. at 797-98. The Court
has not stated, however, that such potential can never be the sole basis for a statute's
invalidation. Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F. 2d 598, 616 n.34 (1980); see Lynch v.
Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984). Several lower federal courts,
however, have interpreted the Court's language in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98, to
preclude use of the political entanglement test as an independent test of constitution-
ality. See, e.g., Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979); Cromwell
Property Owners Ass'n v. Toffolon, 495 F. Supp. 915, 925 (D. Conn. 1979); Womens
Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1039 (D. Neb. 1979), ajy'd, 636 F.2d 206
(8th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981); Americans United
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Court has not stated that the test can never function independently,8 3
the Court has never used the test as the sole basis for striking down a
law. 84
The vast majority of the Court's cases decided under the establish-
ment clause since the creation of the political entanglement test have
called into question the constitutionality of public programs providing
aid to religiously affiliated educational institutions. 85 Unfortunately,
the Court's application of the test in these cases has often appeared
inconsistent. 8 Nevertheless, several recurring factors have played a
for Separation of Church & State v. Board of Educ., 369 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ky.
1974).
83. Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 616 n.34 (1980); see J. Nowak, supra
note 2, at 1035. See supra note 82.
84. See supra note 11.
85. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (state income tax deduction for
all parents with expenses incurred in educating their elementary and secondary
school children); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (state statute reimbursing nonpublic schools for costs incurred in comply-
ing with state-mandated testing, reporting and record-keeping requirements);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state statute providing various forms of
assistance to children in nonpublic schools); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736 (1976) (state grants to private colleges and universities); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan to nonpublic schools of instructional materials; provision of
auxilliary services by public school teachers and counselors to nonpublic school
children on nonpublic school grounds; loans to nonpublic school children of text-
books); Committee for Pub. Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (direct grants for maintenance and repair to predominantly church-related
nonpublic schools; tuition reimbursements and tax benefits to parents of children
attending nonpublic schools); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state bond issue
to help colleges and universities construct facilities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971) (plurality opinion) (participation by four Catholic colleges in federal
program providing construction grants to colleges and universities); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state statutes providing salary supplements to teachers of
secular subjects at church-related elementary and secondary schools and for reim-
bursements to such schools for actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks
and instructional materials).
86. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(inquiry into political division along religious lines appropriate only when program
involves direct grants to religious institutions) with Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-97 (1973) (tax benefits to parents of
children attending nonpublic schools found to create potential for fostering political
division along religious lines) and Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 n.8 (1980) (direct reimbursements to nonpublic schools for
expenses incurred in performing state-mandated testing requirements found not to
hold potential for excessive political division along religious lines) and Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1977) (political divisiveness not addressed in holding
constitutional a program providing therapeutic, guidance and remedial services for
nonpublic school students off nonpublic school grounds) and Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 763 (1976) (plurality opinion) (annual nature of grants
not controlling in entanglement analysis) and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365
n.15 (1975) (direct loans of instructional materials to nonpublic schools found to hold
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role in the Court's determination of whether the challenged statute
has potential for fostering political division along religious lines.8 7 In
its consideration of these factors, the Court examines the challenged
program's potential for fostering such division88 rather than any actual
division which may have already occurred. 89 The Court has focused
on the nature of the challenged program to determine if it is the type
of program that will foster political division along religious lines.90
The Court has correctly refused to rely on evidence of actual division"'
because such an examination would encourage opponents of a pro-
gram to manufacture controversy, hoping that the division created
would be sufficient for the Court to find a constitutional violation.92
Under such an establishment clause test, a program's fate could be
determined by a small but highly vocal minority rather than by a
court's reasoned analysis of the issues.93 Constitutional inquiry, there-
potential for fostering excessive political division along religious lines) and id. at 372
(provision of auxilliary services, including remedial and accelerated instruction,
guidance counseling and testing, and speech and hearing services, to nonpublic
school students on nonpublic school premises found to hold potential for fostering
excessive political division along religious lines) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622-23 (1971) (potential for political division along religious lines aggravated by
need for annual appropriations).
87. See infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
88. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist., 718
F.2d 1389, 1400-01 (6th Cir. 1983); Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 617 n.35
(7th Cir. 1980); see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (challenged statute
created "serious potential for divisive conflict"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (danger of "continuing political
strife over aid to religion"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (state
programs at issue have "divisive political potential"); Ripple, supra note 13, at 1200-
01 (church-state contacts "which might cause religiously-based disputes are forbid-
den").
89. Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 617 n.35 (7th Cir. 1980); see Lynch v.
Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court did not inquire into actual
political divison along religious lines, although Justice Brennan in dissent noted that
the challenged practice had already fostered religious division in the legislature. Id.
at 3339-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring); see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (programs'
potential for divisiveness examined); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-97 (1973) (same); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
622-23 (1971) (same).
91. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(refusing to regard the lawsuit itself as evidence of entanglement).
92. Cf. Schwarz, supra note 60, at 711 (actual strife may be irrational); Weber,
supra note 59, at 208 ("declaring legislation unconstitutional on the basis of potential
political divisiveness" encourages opposing groups to initiate conflict).
93. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (constitutional inquiry focuses on character of challenged
program rather than actual divisiveness); id. at 4327 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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fore, must focus on the character of a governmental program rather
than on the public's possibly irrational reaction to it. 4
The first factor of the analysis is the character- of the benefited
institution.95 Under this factor, the Court seeks to determine whether
religion permeates the institution's atmosphere. 96 When its functions
are solely religious, as is the case with most churches,9 7 for example, it
is said to have a pervasively religious character.9 When an institution
carries on both religious and secular functions-for example, a paro-
chial school or a religiously affiliated college-determination of
whether the institution is pervasively religious depends on the sever-
ability of its functions.9 An institution whose secular function con-
tains a high degree of proselytizing or religious indoctrination is con-
sidered more pervasively religious than an institution whose functions
are clearly distinct.' 00 Conversely, public aid to an institution not
pervasively religious is not likely to foster an excessive degree of politi-
cal division along religious lines because controversy over the aid is
likely to involve the quality of the institution's secular function rather
than its religious character.' 0 ' The Court has concluded that contro-
(same) (quoting id. at 4323 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("fighting words" doctrine requires examination of the words
themselves to see if they provoke violent reaction); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (No words are forbidden except those that tend to cause
violent acts. The test does not turn on "what a particular addressee thinks ... [but]
what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight .... ") (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320,
18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 954-
55 (no need to prove actual violence under fighting words doctrine; a danger is
enough).
94. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-65 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion).
96. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion); see
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976) (plurality opinion).
97. R. Miller & R. Flowers, supra note 7, at 302.
98. Id.; see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (noting religious
character and purpose of Roman Catholic elementary schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (same).
99. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-89 (1971) (plurality opinion).
100. Compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (church-affiliated colleges made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to
proselytize) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-18 (1971) (noting substan-
tial religious character of church-related schools).
101. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (quoting trial court); see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971)
(less potential for divisiveness when benefited institution is not pervasively religious);
cf. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 844 (aid to religiously affiliated colleges will not be
perceived as aid to religion).
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versy over aid to religiously affiliated colleges, for example, is likely to
center on their "fiscal responsibility and educational requirements"'102
because the primary goal of most of these colleges "is to provide their
students with a secular education.' 01 3 Conversely, programs aiding
parochial schools are more likely to engender political division along
religious lines because their curricula "involve substantial religious
activity and purpose.' ' 0 4 The Court assumes, therefore, that parochial
schools are pervasively religious while religiously affiliated colleges are
not. This assumption has led to the Court's conclusion that govern-
mental programs aiding parochial schools are more likely to engender
political division along religious lines than programs aiding the col-
leges 105
The second factor involves the breadth of the class benefited by
public aid. 10 6 When a governmental program aids religious institu-
tions only because they are part of a broader group of recipients who
are being aided without regard to their religious affiliation, the risk of
entanglement is diminished. This is because the public will not per-
ceive a symbolic identification by the government with the benefited
religions. 10 7 Thus, the program is not likely to engender political
division along religious lines. 10 8 When the benefited class is largely
102. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (quoting trial court).
103. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (plurality opinion); see Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973).
104. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); accord Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 746 (1973).
105. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)
(aid program to parochial schools creates potential for political division along reli-
gious lines) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971) (same) with
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(program aiding church-affiliated colleges creates little potential for political division
along religious lines) and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (same).
106. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
794 (1973); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868; see Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976) (plurality opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 688 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971);
Tax Relief, supra note 46, at 819-21.
107. See Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 753 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-
12, at 868-69; cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4323 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (The existence of political divisiveness is evidence that a
governmental practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion.); Tax Relief, supra
note 46, at 821 (broad benefited class reduces perception that government is aiding
religious groups).
108. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 243 n.11 (1977); Public Funds for
Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 518 n.6 (3rd Cir.), aff'd mem., 442 U.S. 907
(1979); Tax Relief, supra note 46 at 821; see also L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at
868 (narrowness of benefited class increases public perception of governmental sym-
bolic identification with religion).
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religiously affiliated, however, the potential for political division in-
creases because the public will likely perceive a governmental identifi-
cation with religion in general or with the particular religion aided. 109
This factor has played a significant role in the Court's determination
that governmental programs that aid both religiously affiliated and
secular colleges will not likely foster excessive political division along
religious lines." 0 By contrast, the institutions benefited by most pro-
grams aiding parochial schools are typically as much as seventy-five
percent church-related."' Consequently, aid to such institutions is
likely to foster political division along religious lines." 2
The third factor is whether the nature of the program requires the
legislature to consider the issue of aid to religious institutions annually
or whether the consideration is a one-time occurrence.1 3 The latter
situation is less likely to divide voters than the annual appropriation
battles necessary to fund many of the programs the Court has consid-
ered. 114
The fourth factor is the directness of the aid received by the reli-
gious institution." 5 The Court has concluded that a program provid-
ing aid directly to a parochial school is more likely to foster political
division along religious lines than a program under which aid flows
directly to the school's students or their parents." 6 In Lynch v. Don-
109. See supra note 108.
110. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (same).
111. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 610 (1971).
112. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 & n.15 (1975) (program aiding
non-public schools, 75% of which were church-related, found to foster political
divisiveness); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(diversity of recipient colleges reduces potential for political division along religious
lines); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (program benefiting relatively
few religious groups likely to foster political division along religious lines).
113. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15, 372 (1975); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-97 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 623 (1971); Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 616 (7th Cir. 1980);
Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 417 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 808
(1972).
114. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (potential for
political divisiveness aggravated by annual appropriation battles) with Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (plurality opinion) (one-time nature of grant
reduces potential for political divisiveness).
115. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984);
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.11 (1983).
116. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(political entanglement analysis not applicable unless challenged program provides
direct aid to religious institutions); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.11
(1983) (same); cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 243 n.11 (1977) (health services
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nelly, 7 the Court indicated that scrutiny of a program's potential for
fostering political division along religious lines is appropriate only
when the program provides direct grants to a religious institution.",8
This final factor illustrates a distinction the Court has implicitly
drawn between religious institutions as ideological interest groups and
provided to students of nonpublic schools not likely to foster political controversy
along religious lines). A possible explanation for the Court's conclusion is that pro-
grams aiding children are not likely to be perceived as aid to religion. Cf. Mueller v.
Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983) (tax deductions for parents incurring educational
expenses for their children primarily benefit parents whose children attend parochial
schools; the schools benefit only because of parents' decision, thus there is no "impri-
matur of State approval" on religion) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
(1981)); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868-69 (political entanglement test based
on concern that aid to religion will be perceived as a symbolic governmental identifi-
cation with benefited religion).
117. 52 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984).
118. Id. at 4321; accord Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.1l (1983). This
factor recently emerged in Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n.11. Mueller involved an
establishment clause challenge to a Minnesota law allowing a state income tax
deduction for parents with expenses incurred in educating their children, even if the
children attended religiously affiliated schools. Id. at 3063-64. The law allowed a
maximum deduction of $500 per dependent in grades kindergarten through six and
$700 per dependent in grades seven through twelve, and only actual expenditures for
tuition, textbooks and transporation were deductible. Id. at 3065. Although the
dissent noted that the vast majority of taxpayers benefited by the law were parents
whose children attended nonpublic schools, id. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the
Court refused to consider a state "Revenue Analysis" reaching the same conclusion.
Id. at 3070 & n.9. On the question of political divisiveness, the Court wrote:
No party to this litigation has urged that the Minnesota plan is invalid
because it runs afoul of the rather elusive inquiry, subsumed under the third
part of the Lemon test, whether the Minnesota statute partakes of the
"divisive political potential" condemned in Lemon. . . . Since this aspect of
the "entanglement" inquiry originated with Lemon . . . , and the Court's
opinion there took pains to distinguish both [Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)], the Court
in Lemon must have been referring to a phenomenon which, although
present in that case, would have been absent in the two cases it distin-
guished.
The Court's language in Lemon ... respecting political divisiveness was
made in the context of [state] statutes which provided for either direct
payment of, or reimbursement of, a proportion of teachers' salaries in
parochial schools. We think, in the light of the treatment of the point in
later cases . . . the language must be regarded as confined to cases where
direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in
parochial schools.
Id. at 3071 n.11.
The Court's conclusion conflicts with earlier cases and suffers from serious doctri-
nal flaws. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), the Court found that tax benefits conferred on parents of children attending
sectarian elementary and secondary schools carried grave potential for fostering
political division along religious lines, id. at 794, because "pressure for frequent
enlargement of the relief [was] predictable." Id. at 797. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421
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as self-interest groups. 1 9 As ideological interest groups, religious insti-
tutions seek the enactment of laws that reflect those institutions' con-
cepts of morality. 120 Through their lobbying efforts on matters such as
birth control, abortion, divorce, gambling and nuclear disarma-
U.S. 349 (1975), the Court found that provision of auxilliary services (remedial and
accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, speech and hearing serv-
ices) to nonpublic school students by public school teachers and counselors created
"serious potential for divisive conflict over the issue of aid to religion .... ." Id. at
372. Additionally, in 1973, the Court summarily affirmed a district court decision
invalidating a system of tax credits for parents of children attending nonpubic
schools. Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem.
sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). The district court had found that the
challenged program held potential for fostering political division along religious
lines. Kosydar, 353 F. Supp. at 766. Thus, the Supreme Court has three times either
held, or affirmed a decision holding, that programs providing aid to nonpublic school
students or their parents, rather than the schools themselves, violated the political
entanglement test. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion in Lynch, "[ilt
seems the Court is willing to alter its analysis from Term to Term in order to suit its
preferred results." 52 U.S.L.W. at 4326 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the Court's reliance on Allen, 392 U.S. 236, and Everson, 330 U.S.
1, to reach its conclusion is misguided. See Lynch, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4327 n.9 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Everson upheld reimbursements to all parents of expenses in-
curred in transporting their children to and from schools. 330 U.S. at 18. Allen
upheld public loans of textbooks to nonpublic school students. 392 U.S. at 248-49.
Although both cases involved aid to nonpublic school students or their parents, rather
than the schools themselves, both cases were decided before the political entangle-
ment test was an element of the Court's establishment clause analysis. See Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 378 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Even if the Court had been correct in its analysis of its prior holdings, it would be
unwise to place so much weight on a single factor in determining whether a program
holds potential for fostering political division along religious lines. In Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), for example, in
which the Court found that a program aiding the parents of children attending
parochial schools held potential for political divisiveness, the Court placed considera-
ble weight on the annual appropriation battles necessary to administer the program.
Id. at 796-97. The Court noted that "pressure for frequent enlargement of the relief is
predictable." Id. at 797. Furthermore, when the class benefited is narrow, see supra
notes 106-12 and accompanying text, as four Justices agreed that it was in Mueller,
103 S. Ct. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting), it is likely that members of religious
groups not within that class will pressure the legislature to provide tax benefits for
expenses incurred in providing other types of religious education. Cf. Lynch, 52
U.S.L.W. at 4326 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (public display of one group's religious
symbol encourages other groups to seek similar display of their symbols).
119. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
796 n.54 (1973) (contrasting political division along religious lines and the normal
political diversity expected in a democratic society); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 623 (1971) (must be expected that members of religious groups take strong
positions on public issues) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970));
L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 62-63 (Court has limited religious institutions' role as
self-interest group but not as ideological interest group); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-
12, at 867-69 (same); Benevolent Neutrality, supra note 11, at 759 n. 129 (Court did
not seek to suppress political activities of religious groups on all issues).
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ment, 121 religious institutions seek "to shape the culture of the commu-
nity according to their own [values].' 2 2 Opponents of the political
entanglement test focus their attack on the stifling effect the test may
have on debate over such ideological issues.' 2 3 This attack is an over-
reaction, 124 for courts have consistently rejected political entangle-
ment challenges to legislation affecting issues that are purely of an
ideological nature. 125 Indeed, in applying the political entanglement
test, the Court has been most careful to include language encouraging
lobbying on such issues.' 26 It has been recognized that application of
the test to ideological issues would, even if desirable, 27 be highly
120. See L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 61; M. Stedman, Religion and Politics in
America 84 (1964).
121. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 867; Choper I, supra note 82, at 684; see
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); E. Rabb, The Nature of the
Conflict: An Introduction, in Religious Conflict in America 17 (E. Rabb. ed. 1964);
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 Calif. L. Rev.
260, 273 (1968); Ripple, supra note 13, at 1226 & n.194.
122. L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 61; see M. Howe, The Garden and the Wilder-
ness 62 (1965); P. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 83-85 (1964); M. Stedman,
supra note 120, at 84.
123. See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 8, at 207-09; Hitchcock II, supra note 70, at
16-17; Hitchcock I, supra note 59, at 203; Weber, supra note 59, at 205.
124. See L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 61-62 (church spokesmen misinterpreted
Court's intent); Young & Tigges, Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment
Clause: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 Cath. Law. 35, 68 (1983) (Court was not
suggesting that the establishment clause forbids political advocacy by religious
groups); Note, Religious Meetings on Public School Property: The Constitutional
Dimensions of Church-State Neutrality, 15 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 103, 131 (1981) (Court
may refuse to apply political entanglement test when speech and associational activ-
ity are implicated); cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (state may not regulate speech to prevent religious strife).
125. See, e.g., McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Womens Servs., P.C.
v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1039 (D. Neb. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.
1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981); Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1195 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1979),
modified on other grounds, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989
(1982); see also Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
("Nothing that this Court has said ... should be construed as implying that advo-
cacy by religious forces on the general political problems facing our society should be
disallowed or even discouraged."), aff'd mem. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S.
901 (1973).
126. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 796 n.54 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
127. See Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (advocacy
by religious groups on general political problems should not be discouraged), aff'd
mei. sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-
12, at 867-68 (to regard political activity by religious groups on ideological issues as
improper may be inconsistent with rights of free exercise and free speech).
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impractical because there is rarely such an issue before the legislature
on which religious groups do not diverge.' 2 8 Furthermore, the role of
the political entanglement test is not to invalidate statutes because of
how they were enacted, for that is the role of the secular purpose
test. 129 Instead, the political entanglement test scrutinizes religious
institutions' opportunities to exert power over the political process
during the annual appropriation battles necessary to implement chal-
lenged statutes. 130
The political entanglement test focuses on religious institutions as
self-interest groups, rather than as ideological interest groups.13 '
While as ideological interest groups religious institutions seek govern-
mental support of a point of view, 132 as self-interest groups they seek
governmental financing of their own functions. 133 It is political divi-
sion over appropriations to religious institutions that the Court con-
siders a dangerous intrusion by religious interests into the political
process. '34 Despite its recognition that such intrusion is dangerous,
however, the Court has never utilized the political entanglement test
as an independent test of constitutionality. 135 Certain governmental
programs that pass scrutiny under the first three prongs of Lemon,
however, may lead to results that the Court regards as establishment
clause violations. For example, the implementation of a program
providing aid to a religious institution's secular function may require
annual appropriation battles in which controversy centers on reli-
gion. 13 Although the program may not violate the primary effect test
because the aid to religion is indirect,' 37 such battles would give
128. See Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1039 (D. Neb. 1979),
aff'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 911 (1981).
129. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
130. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
796-97 (1973) (noting increasing ,pressure by religious groups for larger and larger
subsidies during appropriations battles); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623
(1971) (same).
131. L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 62; see L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 867.
132. See L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 61; M. Stedman, supra note 120, at 84, 136.
133. See L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 62; M. Stedman, supra note 120, at 136; L.
Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 867.
134. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
796-97 & n.54 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
135. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 9-105, 113-14 and accompanying text.
137. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 (1983) (tax deductions to all
parents with educational expenses incurred in educating their children); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. "646, 657 (1980) (direct
reimbursements to nonpublic schools for expenses incurred in performing state-
mandated testing requirements); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977)
(program providing guidance and remedial services for nonpublic school students).
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politically powerful groups opportunities to influence legislative deci-
sions to such a degree that they would not be religiously neutral. The
political entanglement test as a fourth prong would strike down these
pr6grams. It is therefore necessary to justify the political entangle-
ment test as an independent test of constitutionality.
III. JUSTIFYING THE POLITICAL ENTANGLEMENT TEST AS A FOURTH
PRONG
A. Historical Basis
At the political entanglement test's inception, the Court wrote that
"political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.' 138 The
Court cited no historical support for its proposition. Critics of the
political entanglement test charge that the Court failed to cite such
support because none exists.139
The intent of the first amendment's framers has created significant
controversy. 140 There exists a "seemingly irresistible impulse" to seek
In Mueller, 103 S. Ct. 3062, the Court held that a Minnesota statute providing for
an income tax deduction for all parents with expenses incurred in educating their
children did not violate any of the Lemon prongs. Id. at 3067, 3071 & n.11. The
deduction could not exceed $700 per dependent. Id. at 3065. Although the Court
refused to acknowledge its accuracy, a Minnesota Department of Revenue "Revenue
Analysis" indicated that the prime beneficiaries of the deduction were parents of
children attending nonpublic schools because public school students incurred mini-
mal educational expenses. Id. at 3070 n.9; see id. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(vast majority of parents of students in public schools not eligible for tax benefit). The
Court did acknowledge that "financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has
an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by
their children." Id. at 3069. Because over ninety-five percent of the students attend-
ing nonpublic schools attended sectarian schools, id. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), these schools have a strong incentive to pressure the legislature for a higher
ceiling on the deduction. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-97 (1973) (noting predictability of pressure by sectarian
schools to increase tax benefits to parents of children attending sectarian schools).
Additionally, it is likely that parents of children attending public schools may seek
tax benefits to defray costs in providing religious education for their children. Cf.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4326 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (public display of one group's religious symbol encourages other groups to
seek similar display of their symbols).
138. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citing Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969)); see Note, The Establishment
Clause and Liquor Sales: The Supreme Court Rushes in Where Angels Fear to Tread,
59 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 94 (1983); cf. A. Johnson & F. Yost, Separation of Church and
State in the United States 113 (1948) (Constitution designed to prevent division of
society into "political and sectarian camps").
139. See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 8, at 206; Schotten, supra note 8, at 224-28;
Weber, supra note 59, at 205-06.
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support for analyses of the religion clauses from the first amendment's
legislative history. ' 4 This impulse is misguided because a consensus on
the amendment's meaning among the framers and the ratifying states
is not evident. 42 Rather, the amendment's history reflects several
contradictory views on its purpose.1 43 Moreover, even if the framers
had demonstrated a single and unambiguous intent, changes the na-
tion has undergone in the last 200 years would seriously limit the value
of its precise implementation. 44
Although the first amendment's legislative history is not clear, an
historical study of the period in which the amendment was enacted
suggests at least three distinct theories on the value of church-state
separation which may have influenced the framers. At the ideological
extremes were Thomas Jefferson's secular separatism 45 and the radi-
140. R. Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion 21 (1972); see, e.g., M. Howe,
supra note 122, at 19 (tracing Religion Clauses to the "evangelical hope that private
conscience and autonomous churches, working together and in freedom, would
extend the rule of truth"); J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1029 ("no clear history" to first
amendment); J. Whitehead, The Separation Illusion 88 (1977) (first amendment's
framers intended to "leave the states a free hand in religion-free to establish their
churches, free to permit Bible reading and prayer in the schools"); Freund, supra
note 138, at 1692 (first amendment sought to forestall "political division on religious
lines"); Gaffney, supra note 8, at 216 (no "documentary evidence" framers sought to
repress political division along religious lines); Kurland, supra note 7, at 13 (first
amendment's primary purpose "was to keep the national government out of religious
matters").
141. J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1029; see R. Morgan, supra note 140, at 21. The
Supreme Court has succumbed to this impulse on many occasions. See, e.g., Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
622-25 (1978) (plurality opinion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-33 (1962);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-39 (1961); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947); id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
142. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3347 & n.32 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); R. Morgan, supra note 145, at 24; J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1029-30; L.
Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816; Choper I, supra note 82, at 676; Kurland, supra
note 7, at 14.
143. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); R. Morgan, supra note 140, at 24; J. Nowak, supra note 2, at 1030; Kurland,
supra note 7, at 11-14.
144. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3348 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (Constitution not a static document); West Va. State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (must apply generalities of Bill of Rights to twentieth
century problems); Choper I, supra note 82, at 676 (framers' intent may not be in
accord with contemporary values); see, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
238-39 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (change in structure of American education);
id. at 240-41 (nation has become more religiously heterogeneous); Choper I, supra
note 82, at 676 (same; further, public education virtually non-existent at ratification
of Bill of Rights and increased governmental regulation of private institutions esca-
lates church-state contacts); Kurland, supra note 7, at 9-11 (incorporation of religion
clauses in fourteenth amendment changes their original meaning).
145. P. Kauper, supra note 122, at 48; see L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816-
17; Kurland, supra note 7, at 11.
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cal protestant separatism most often associated with the Anabaptist
Roger Williams. 146 While both schools agreed on the principle of
separatism, 47 they differed on its rationale. Jefferson believed that the
state would function properly only if protected from "ecclesiastical
depredations and excursions."' 148 Achievement of that protection re-
quired building "a wall of separation between Church and State. ' 149
Williams, however, believed that the church needed protection from
the corrupting influence of the state. 150 In contrast to Jefferson, whose
separatist philosophy arose from political theory, 151 Williams derived
his separatism from theology. 152 He viewed a church infiltrated or
established by the state as a church corrupted.153
James Madison advanced a third philosophy. 54 He believed that
individual religious freedom depended on the removal of religious
matters from legislative cognizance. 155 Governmental intervention in
religion was likely to result "in a conformity to the creed of the
146. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816-17; see M. Howe, supra note 122, at 8;
P. Kauper, supra note 145, at 48; Kurland, supra note 7, at 11.
147. See L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 817.
148. M. Howe, supra note 122, at 2; see Kurland, supra note 7, at 11.
149. 16 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 282 (1903); see Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
The "wall of separation" metaphor originated with Williams. See M. Howe, supra
note 122, at 6. Williams wrote: "[W]hen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall
of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God
hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden
a wilderness .. ." Id. at 5-6. In 1802, Jefferson adopted the metaphor in a reply to a
public address at the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut. He wrote: "I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between Church and State." 16 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 281-82 (1903).
150. M. Howe, supra note 122, at 6; P. Kurland, Religion and the Law 17 (1962);
see P. Kauper, supra note 145, at 48.
151. M. Howe, supra note 122, at 7-8; see P. Kauper, supra note 145, at 48.
152. M. Howe, supra note 122, at 8. See generally 1 A. Stokes, Church and State
in the United States 194-202 (1950) (discussing Williams' theory of separation and its
impact on religious freedom in America).
153. See M. Howe, supra note 122, at 6; L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816
(quoting M. Howe, supra note 131, at 6); Katz, Radiations From Church Tax
Exemption, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 93, 97.
154. See L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 816; Kurland, supra note 7, at 11.
155. See J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in 2 Writings of James Madison 185 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) ("We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society,
and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no other rule
exists, by which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately deter-
mined, but the will of the majority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass
on the rights of the minority."), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
64-65 app. (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Kurland, supra note 7, at 11.
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majority and a single sect, if amounting to a majority."'- 56 Madison
regarded accommodation of religious interests as well as the actual
establishment of a particular religion as a danger to minority rights.157
The most dangerous accommodation, Madison argued, was public
financial support of religious institutions.158
In formulating the entanglement tests, the Court has drawn from
all three of these philosophies. 59 The administrative entanglement
test reflects Williams' belief that government infiltration into church
affairs compromises the church's mission. 60 The Court's two views on
the danger of political division along religious lines embody, respec-
tively, Jefferson's desire to protect state from church' 6' and Madison's
concern for minority rights.162 The first view, 63 that such division
corrupts the political process by diverting attention from other issues,
reflects Jefferson's argument that government cannot function prop-
erly if infiltrated by religious interests. The second view, 64 that such
division leads to excessive influence over the political process by pow-
erful religious groups, embraces Madison's notion that removing reli-
gious matters from legislative cognizance best safeguards individual
liberty. Madison argued that if the legislature addressed issues affect-
156. Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 Wm. & Mary Q. 3d 561 (E. Fleet ed.
1946) [hereinafter cited as "Detached Memoranda'].
157. Curry, supra note 74, at 619; see J. Madison, supra note 155, at 189-90(arguing against a tax levy to support an established state church), reprinted in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 70-71 app. (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 819 (Madison argued for more than institutional
separation between church and state). See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947) (discussing Jefferson's and Madison's opposition to an established
church in Virginia).
158. See J. Madison, supra note 160, at 184-86, reprinted in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 app. (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) ("[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."); L.
Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-3, at 819 (same).
159. See A. Howard, Up Against the Wall: The Uneasy Theory of Church &
State, in Church, State, and Politics 23 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (tracing political en-
tanglement test to Madison); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 865-66 (tracing
purpose and effect tests to Madison; political entanglement test to Jefferson; adminis-
trative entanglement test to Williams); Kurland, supra note 7, at 17 (tracing purpose
and effect tests to Jefferson; administrative entanglement tests to Williams); see also
Curry, supra note 74, passim (tracing political entanglement test to Madison).
160. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866; Kurland, supra note 7, at 11, 17. See
supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
161. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866. See supra notes 147-51 and accom-
panying text.
162. Curry, supra note 74, passim. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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ing religious interests, the controlling faction would inevitably tri-
umph.16 5
The attempt by supporters and critics of the political entanglement
test to find support for their views in the first amendment's legislative
history is likely a futile endeavor. 16 An examination of the separatist
philosophies that may have influenced the framers, however, reveals
that the political entanglement test has an historical basis.'6 7 More-
over, the political entanglement test also derives support from the
Court's view of the dangers against which the establishment clause
protects.
B. Theoretical Basis for a Fourth Prong
A governmental program that passes scrutiny under the first three
prongs of Lemon may nevertheless lead to legislative decisions that
violate the establishment clause mandate that governmental decisions
be religiously neutral. 168 The political entanglement test as a fourth
prong would reach these violations and thereby strike down the pro-
gram. While the secular purpose test ensures that a legislature did not
intend its enactment to advance or inhibit religion, 16 9 and the primary
effect test ensures that a law's effects do not directly and immediately
advance religion, 170 the political entanglement test identifies laws that
in the future may give politically powerful religious groups opportuni-
ties to exert excessive influence over governmental appropriation deci-
sions.' 7 ' Just as the administrative entanglement test seeks to predict
the future effect of church-state contact on religious institutions, 72 the
political entanglement test scrutinizes the future effect of such contact
on legislative decisions.173 When a law by its nature creates a potential
164. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
165. J. Madison, supra note 155, at 185 ("Because if religion be exempt from the
authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative
Body."), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65 app. (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
166. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
171. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (challenged statute provided
"successive opportunities for political fragmentation and division along religious
lines"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797
(1973) ("pressure for frequent enlargement of the relief is predictable ... [a]nd the
larger the class of recipients, the greater the pressure for accelerated increases");
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) ("likelihood of larger and larger
demands").
172. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
173. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971) (appropriations battles
will force candidates to declare their positions on religious issues, and many "will
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for dividing the legislature along religious lines, the law may lead to
legislative decisions representing the "fusion of governmental and reli-
gious functions"1 74 that the Court condemned in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc.. 175 Such fusion would lead to legislative decisions that
would not be religiously neutral, 176 and hence, would violate the
establishment clause.
The Court has identified governmental neutrality as a principal
religion clause value.177 Government must seek to achieve only secular
goals. It must not favor any one religion over other religions, or
religion over non-religion.1 78 The political entanglement test seeks to
identify governmental programs that, by their very nature, will so
involve religious interests with the political process that government
will be unable to act neutrally. 179 The test does not focus on the
present purpose behind the legislature's enactment, which is scruti-
find their votes aligned with their faith"); The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 3, 173 (1971) (political entanglement analysis examines "what is likely to
happen in the political arena") [hereinafter cited as 1970 Term]; cf. Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Public money devoted
to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It
brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by
numbers alone will benefit most, there another. . . . The end of such strife cannot be
other than to destroy the cherished liberty. The dominating group will achieve the
dominant benefit .... ).
174. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982) (quoting School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)); see Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972
Term, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1973) (Political controversy along sectarian lines is the first step
to a union of government and religion.).
175. 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982). See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
176. 1970 Term, supra note 173, at 173 (The political entanglement inquiry
"forces consideration ... of whether [a] law's pattern of benefits is religiously
neutral, for religiously partisan political activity is a likely precursor or consequence
of nonneutrality."); cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (Taxation for church purposes puts the state "squarely in the religious
activities of certain religious groups that happen to be strong enough politically to
write their own religious preferences and prejudices into the laws."). See infra notes
177-97 and accompanying text.
177. Ellington, supra note 9, at 439; see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215, 218, 222, 226 (1963); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-4, at 820.
178. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
179. 1970 Term, supra note 173, at 173.
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nized under the secular purpose test, 80 but on powerful religious
groups' future opportunities for directing more and more of govern-
ment's limited funds to their secular functions.' 8' As a result, the
Court has regarded governmental programs that require annual ap-
propriation battles as far more likely to foster excessive political entan-
glement than laws requiring only one-time expenditures.182 Yearly
quests for larger subsidies will enable religious groups with political
strength to exert their power over the political process. 8 3 Legislators,
who must answer to their constituencies, will inevitably yield to polit-
ical pressure,18 4 and future legislative decisions will not be religiously
neutral. 8 5 Consequently, groups with political power will likely re-
ceive the largest appropriations, and weaker groups, solely because
they are weak, will be financially and symbolically disadvantaged.',,
In spite of this need to ensure governmental neutrality, it may be
argued that if a law does not violate the primary effect test, any
controversy surrounding the law's implementation will not be over
religion. 8 7 As applied by the Court, however, the primary effect test
allows substantial aid to an institution's religious function provided
that the aid is indirect and incidental to a secular legislative pur-
pose. 8  Aid directed to an institution's secular function relieves the
institution's burden of financing that function.8 9 The institution can
180. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
181. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
796-97 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
182. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
183. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
184. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
185. See 1970 Term, supra note 173, at 173.
186. See L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868 (emphasizing symbolic harm); Tax
Relief, supra note 46, at 820 ("establishment clause protects against the political
ascendancy of one religious sect over another"). See supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
187. Cf. Choper I, supra note 82, at 684 ("[I]f a law serves genuinely secular
purposes-or impairs no one's religious liberty by coercing, compromising or influ-
encing religious beliefs-there is no persuasive reason to hold it unconstitutional
simply because its proponents and opponents were divided along religious lines.");
Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First Amendment, 14 Val. U.L. Rev.
487, 513- (1980) ("[The] question of whether political division along religious lines is a
sufficient basis for overturning a statute is closely related to the question of whether a
statute's purpose can be rendered nonsecular by virtue of underlying religious moti-
vation.").
188. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). See supra notes 33-41 and
accompanying text.
189. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 776 (1973).
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use money saved on secular items to finance its religious function.190
Thus, a governmental program permitting powerful religious groups
to direct funds to their secular functions will put groups lacking power
at a comparative disadvantage. The weaker groups ultimately will
have fewer resources to support their religious functions than the
powerful groups because the government will not be paying their
bills.
When the benefited institution's character is pervasively reli-
gious, 191 aid it receives is likely to be perceived as governmental
sponsorship and symbolic governmental identification with a particu-
lar religion.'9 2 Religious institutions not within the class benefited will
apply political pressure for similar funding of their secular func-
tions. 1 3 Annual appropriation battles thus will inevitably lead to
legislative decisions based on either legislators' religious preferences or
legislators' responses to political power. 14 Such decisions will be made
in "conformity to the creed of the majority and a single sect, if
amounting to a majority."'19 5 Thus, a law that the legislature intended
to serve a secular purpose, and that provides only indirect aid to
religion, may in its implementation so entangle religious interests with
the political process that legislative decisions will not be neutral.
Because such a law would enable more powerful religions to grow at
the expense of weaker religions, a check is necessary. The political
entanglement test as a fourth prong provides this check.
Critics of the political entanglement test also argue, however, that
the test is inconsistent with representative democracy.9 6 They con-
tend that the test places an impermissible burden on religious institu-
tions' rights to freedom of speech and participation in the political
process. 1 7 The first amendment, however, places a direct limit on
190. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 776 (1973).
191. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
192. L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 868-69; 1970 Term, supra note 173, at
173.
193. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4326 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (public display of one group's religious symbol encourages
other groups to seek similar display of their symbols).
194. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
195. "Detached Memoranda," supra note 156, at 561.
196. A. Howard, supra note 159, at 23-24; L. Pfeffer, supra note 55, at 61;
Benevolent Neutrality, supra note 11, at 758-59; see Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality:
The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 177,
194-96.
197. Benevolent Neutrality, supra note 11, at 758-59; see Toscano, supra note 196,
at 194-96.
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legislatures' power to enact laws "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion."'' lg The Court has construed this clause to proscribe legislative
actions that are not religiously neutral. 9 ' If a law by its nature will
lead to non-neutral legislative decisions, then the law violates the
establishment clause and is therefore beyond the legislature's
power. 200 Furthermore, because only religious self-interest issues are
within the test's scope, 20 1 the test will not interfere with religious
groups' ability to affect legislation on ideological issues.
It may also be argued that pressure by religious institutions on the
legislature for funding of their secular functions cannot violate the
establishment clause because the Court has held constitutional even
direct aid to those functions.2 02 This argument, however, ignores the
Court's inquiry into the benefited institution's pervasion by religion in
determining whether the challenged program holds potential for fos-
tering excessive political division along religious lines.2 0 3 The more
pervaded by religion, the more likely the controversy before the legis-
lature will center on matters of religion, and hence, the more likely
legislatures will divide along religious lines. 20 4 Controversy surround-
ing appropriations to a church-affiliated hospital, for example, 20 will
more likely center on the quality of the medical treatment it provides
than on its religious affiliation.208 Conversely, parochial school aid is
more likely to foster controversy over the school's religious character
than over its secular function. 20 7 Thus, the inquiry turns not on the
198. See supra note 3.
199. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
200. Cf. Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797 n.56 (1973) ("for what today is a 'trickling stream' may be a torrent tomorrow")
(quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
201. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
202. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (state grants to colleges and universities including four church-affiliated
colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1973) (state bond issue to help
colleges and universities construct facilities including Baptist college); Tilton v. Ri-
chardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion) (participation by four Catho-
lic colleges in federal construction grant program).
203. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
205. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), cited with approval in Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976) (plurality opinion), the Court
upheld a District of Columbia contract for care of the poor with a church-affiliated
hospital. Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 299-300; see L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 844.
206. Cf. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (controversy over aid to religiously-affiliated colleges likely to center on
their "fiscal responsibility and educational requirements"); L. Tribe, supra note 3, §
14-9, at 844 (aid to religiously-affiliated hospital will not be perceived as aid to
religion).
207. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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nature of the function benefited, but on the nature of the controversy.
When the controversy concerns the benefited institution's religious
character, the legislature will inevitably make non-neutral decisons.
The establishment clause demands religious neutrality in all legisla-
tive decisions. A law that does not heed this demand infringes the
rights of the members of the disfavored religious groups. Because a
law that passes scrutiny under the first three prongs of Lemon may
lead in its implementation to non-neutral legislative decisions, the
establishment clause demands that the political entanglement test be
advanced to a fourth prong, independently capable of striking down
that law.
CONCLUSION
The political entanglement test seeks to identify legislation that
holds potential for fostering political division along religious lines.
Such division leads to a fusion of governmental and religious func-
tions, a danger recognized by both the Supreme Court and James
Madison, author of the first amendment. Legislation providing finan-
cial aid to the secular functions of pervasively religious institutions
creates this danger. The periodic appropriation battles necessary to
administer such legislation will enable religious groups with political
strength to exert excessive influence over legislative decisions. The
dominant group will achieve the dominant benefit, and politically
weak religious groups will be both financially and symbolically disad-
vantaged.
Legislative decisions made on the basis of religious rather than
secular criteria violate the establishment clause mandate that the
government act neutrally as among all religions and between religion
and nonreligion. Governmental programs leading to nonneutral legis-
lative decisions may pass scrutiny under the first three prongs of
Lemon. The establishment clause demands, therefore, that the politi-
cal entanglement test be elevated to a fourth and independent prong,
capable of invalidating such programs.
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